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In mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), the loca-
tion-based multipath routing protocols involves less 
routing overhead compared to non-location-based 
protocols. This paper proposes two location-based al-
gorithms, Enhanced Location-aided Level-based node 
Disjoint Multipath routing (ELLDMR) and Secure 
Location-aided Level-based node Disjoint Multipath 
routing (SLLDMR), to enhance the link lifetime and 
the security of the MANET. The objective of ELLD-
MR is to build multiple paths with non-critical nodes 
so that the lifetime of the routing path is significant-
ly increased. It also hides the source, destination and 
path identity in intermediate nodes to avoid intrusion 
of routing attacks in the routing path. The SLLDMR 
is an enhancement over ELLDMR where it aims to 
overcome rushing attack and exhibit secure data trans-
mission using two-level cryptographic processes. The 
performances of ELLDMR and SLLDMR are simu-
lated using NS2 where it shows a minimum routing 
overhead, less end to end delay and high packet deliv-
ery compared to existing Location-aided Level-based 
node Disjoint Multipath routing (LLDMR) algorithm 
and Topology Hiding multipath protocol (TOHIP).
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: Networks → Net-
work protocols → Network layer protocols → Rout-
ing protocols
Security and privacy → Cryptography → Cryptanal-
ysis and other attacks
Keywords: node disjoint multipath, noncritical nodes, 
link lifetime, routing attacks
1. Introduction
In MANET [1], the secure multipath routing pro-
tocols [2] fail to hide the topology information 
during route discovery and packet transmission 
phase. So, the adversary nodes can eventually 
invade into the routing path using the topology 
information in the routing messages. Therefore, 
topology exposure problem is a big challenge 
in MANET. Many active attacks [3], [4] like 
black hole attack, worm-hole attack, rushing 
attack, replay attacks, etc. can likely make use 
of this topology information and possibly get 
into the routing path. The existing security pro-
tocols are either cryptographic like ARAN [5], 
SRP [6], ARIADNE [7] or source and destina-
tion anonymous routing protocols like ANODR 
[8], ARMAN [9], ALERT [10]. The anonymous 
security routing protocols increase the routing 
overhead and cryptographic routing protocols 
are more expensive. So, topology hiding during 
the route discovery phase would be a better 
solution for preventing the inclusion of attacker 
nodes in the routing path. Therefore, this paper 
proposes two topology hiding routing algo-
rithms, namely ELLDMR and SLLDMR. The 
performance of these algorithms is evaluated 
and compared with existing topology hiding 
multipath routing protocol TOHIP [11].
The ELLDMR and SLLDMR are proposed 
for secure route discovery and secure packet 
transmission in MANET. The main objective 
of these two algorithms is to ensure safe deliv-
ery of the packet to the destination, without any 
alteration or loss of data. The first algorithm 
ELLDMR is proposed to overcome the topolo-
gy exposure problem where it hides the source, 
destination and routing path information in 
the intermediate nodes during route discovery. 
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Due to this anonymity, it is impossible for the 
attacker nodes to intrude into the routing path 
using false information.
The second algorithm SLLDMR is proposed 
for secure packet transmission using two-level 
encryption and decryption processes. In SLLD-
MR, the nodes do not depend on any central-
ized trusted server to generate their public or 
private key as in other security algorithms. This 
makes the attacker node difficult to forge these 
keys from the centralized server using fake 
identities. Also, the encryption or decryption 
are done only at the source and destination in 
SLLDMR, and so, they involve less cost when 
compared to other cryptographic algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes MANET security. Section 3 gives a 
survey of related work. Section 4 and Section 
5 elaborate on the proposed work, ELLDMR, 
and SLLDMR algorithm respectively. Section 
6 presents the experimental results. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes the proposed work with the 
scope for future work.
2. Security in MANET
The network layer attacks [4] are generally 
classified as external and internal attacks; ex-
ternal attacks are caused by the nodes which 
are outside the transmission region of the net-
work while internal attacks are caused by the 
compromised nodes within the same network. 
Based on the severity of external or internal at-
tacks, network layer attacks are further divided 
into active and passive attacks. A passive attack 
overhears the packet information and does not 
cause any damage or alteration to it. Ex: eaves-
dropping, traffic analysis, and monitoring. An 
active attack is a dangerous attack as it damag-
es or discards the packet by not allowing it to 
reach the destination. Sometimes, it intends to 
alter the packet information and so the impact 
of active attacks in the network layer is more 
serious. Ex: jamming, spoofing, modification, 
replaying and DoS attacks.
Many research works were carried out to avoid 
these passive and active attacks. Secure routing 
protocols like ARAN [5], ARIADNE [7], SA-
ODV [12] are cryptographic based single path 
routing protocols and they are expensive. But 
the performance of multipath routing protocols 
is far better than single path routing protocols 
as in multipath routing protocols the path, in-
cluding adversary nodes, could be avoided and 
a different path can be chosen for secure packet 
transmission. The secure multipath routing pro-
tocols are mostly node-disjoint, only then the 
adversary nodes could be easily controlled.
3. Related Works
The on-demand Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) 
[13] is a node-disjoint multipath routing mainly 
designed for Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). 
The security association between source and 
destination is established by exchanging a se-
cret symmetric key. This is generated using 
public keys of sender and receiver and, thus, 
mutual authentication is enabled between them.
The secure multipath routing protocol [14] 
is a multipath routing protocol based on the 
Ford-Fulkerson MaxFlow algorithm. Unlike 
SRP, it authenticates every intermediate node 
included in the routing path using digital sig-
natures. Also, it finds all possible multiple 
paths between the source and destination with-
in a TTL period. The size of the route request 
(RREQ) packet increases as it appends the pre-
viously received information for every broad-
cast. The main drawback of this protocol is that 
it cannot compromise with route request costs 
and so the delay and processing power increase.
The SecMR [15] is a Secure Multipath Routing 
protocol which reduces the node authentication 
cost by dividing the protocol into two phases. 
The first phase is an authentication phase, 
where at regular (periodic) time intervals, the 
neighbour nodes are verified using digital sig-
natures. In the second phase, these authenticat-
ed nodes participate in route discovery. This in-
creases the lifetime of route request compared 
to the SRP.
The cryptographic techniques employed in 
some of these protocols are more expensive and 
so they are cost effective. All of these multipath 
routing protocols carry the routing information 
during the route discovery period and thus ex-
pose the topology information to attacker nodes. 
TOHIP [11] is the first routing protocol to find 
a solution to this topology exposure problem. 
4. Enhanced Location-aided 
Level-based Disjoint Multipath 
Routing Protocol (ELLDMR)
4.1. ELLDMR Data Structure
The proposed algorithm ELLDMR is an en-
hanced Location-aided Level-based disjoint 
multipath routing protocol. The route discovery 
phase of ELLDMR is an extension over LLD-
MR so that it can provide a strong link in the 
routing path. During the route discovery phase, 
the forwarding nodes for packet transmission 
are chosen in such a way that its path lifetime 
is longer and the link failure rate is less when 
compared to LLDMR.
Like LLDMR, the ELLDMR broadcasts Loca-
tion Request packet (LREQ) to find the loca-
tion of the destination. The destination node ac-
knowledges the LREQ by sending its location 
information through the Location Reply packet 
(LREP) to the source. After learning the des-
tination location, the ELLDMR identifies the 
intermediate nodes for RREQ broadcast and 
groups them into different levels with respect 
to their distance from the destination node. Fig-
ure 1 shows the intermediate nodes between the 
This protocol is a loop-free secure node disjoint 
multipath routing protocol. Every node in this 
protocol knows only its neighbour information 
and is not exposed to topology information. It 
uses hop count and round-trip time together as 
the routing metric to avoid worm hole and rush-
ing attack. To make a reliable transmission, it 
initiates route probe phase before transmitting 
the packet towards the destination.
The enhanced TOHIP [11] does neighbour au-
thentication by obtaining the certificate from 
a trusted certificate server so that it can resist 
modification attack, impersonation attack, and 
fabrication attack. The drawback of this pro-
tocol is that it chooses the intermediate nodes 
based on the number of hop counts and does 
not consider their mobility parameter. Since in 
MANET the nodes are highly mobile in nature, 
it is better to choose the intermediate nodes 
which do not move out of the transmission 
region earlier when compared to other nodes. 
Even the location of the nodes within the trans-
mission range is to be considered when choos-
ing the intermediate node. Since MANET does 
not have proper infrastructure, having a trusted 
certificate server is a tricky and cost-effective 
process. Therefore, the existing protocol, en-
hanced TOHIP is not highly reliable and secure.
LLDMR [16] is the Location-aided Level-based 
disjoint multipath routing protocol, where like 
LAR [17], it identifies the intermediate nodes 
between the source and destination using their 
location information and divides them into dif-
ferent levels depending on the node's distance 
from the destination. Figure 1 shows different 
levels of the nodes and the inter-links and in-
tra-links between these nodes. This algorithm 
predicts the occurrence of link failure and sends 
the notification to the source node and switches 
to the alternate route during packet transmis-
sion based on the node's position. The major 
drawback of this protocol is that it does not find 
all existing multipaths as it avoids duplicate 
RREQ broadcast. So, in case of a frequent link 
failure, the multiple paths found are not suffi-
cient for packet transmission and this may lead 
the LLDMR to initiate a route discovery phase. 
Also, the algorithm has not provided any secu-
rity mechanism to overcome routing attacks. 
In this paper, two algorithms, ELLDMR and 
SLLDMR, are proposed to enhance the route 






































Figure 1. Inter-link and intra-link representation of 
intermediate nodes.
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Due to this anonymity, it is impossible for the 
attacker nodes to intrude into the routing path 
using false information.
The second algorithm SLLDMR is proposed 
for secure packet transmission using two-level 
encryption and decryption processes. In SLLD-
MR, the nodes do not depend on any central-
ized trusted server to generate their public or 
private key as in other security algorithms. This 
makes the attacker node difficult to forge these 
keys from the centralized server using fake 
identities. Also, the encryption or decryption 
are done only at the source and destination in 
SLLDMR, and so, they involve less cost when 
compared to other cryptographic algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes MANET security. Section 3 gives a 
survey of related work. Section 4 and Section 
5 elaborate on the proposed work, ELLDMR, 
and SLLDMR algorithm respectively. Section 
6 presents the experimental results. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes the proposed work with the 
scope for future work.
2. Security in MANET
The network layer attacks [4] are generally 
classified as external and internal attacks; ex-
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the performance of multipath routing protocols 
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as in multipath routing protocols the path, in-
cluding adversary nodes, could be avoided and 
a different path can be chosen for secure packet 
transmission. The secure multipath routing pro-
tocols are mostly node-disjoint, only then the 
adversary nodes could be easily controlled.
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The security association between source and 
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cret symmetric key. This is generated using 
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natures. Also, it finds all possible multiple 
paths between the source and destination with-
in a TTL period. The size of the route request 
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cast. The main drawback of this protocol is that 
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Figure 1. Inter-link and intra-link representation of 
intermediate nodes.
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source and destination and their different lev-
els, intra-level and inter-level nodes.
The neighbour list, information database, and 
routing table are the three data structures main-
tained by the forwarding nodes in ELLDMR. 
Their contents are:
 ● Neighbour List: In the neighbour list, each 
node maintains the neighbour (id, location, 
speed, direction) information.
 ● Node Information Database: Table 1 shows 
the record of data stored in each node. The 
node information database of ELLDMR 
includes the node's threshold value (TH 
(Nodemn)), level's minimum threshold val-
ue (TH-MIN (Leveln)), and level's maxi-
mum threshold value (TH-MAX (Leveln)) 
and other information of the node. These 
are calculated using equation (1, 2, 3) re-
spectively.
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 The constant value C is defined as a change 
of the threshold value of the node for every 
second.
( ) ( )( ), , ,
MC
Dist S x y D x y
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(4)
 where M is the maximum distance a node 
can travel per second.
 ● Routing table: Table 2 shows the contents 
of the intermediate node's routing table, 
where each intermediate node maintains 
its own information and previous node 
(Prev → id) and next node (Next → id) in-
formation. The next node is the next for-
warding node to which the intermediate 
nodes transmit the data packets received 
by them. Thus ELLDMR does not expose 
the topology information to the intermedi-
ate nodes.
4.2. Critical and Noncritical Section Nodes
The critical section and non-critical section re-
gions are defined as follows
 ● The non-critical section of leveln is defined 
as the section between (TH-MIN (leveln) + 
C) and (TH-MAX (leveln) – C).
 ● The critical section of leveln is defined as 
the section, excluding the non-critical sec-
tion of leveln. The critical section regions 
are generally the boundary region between 
any two levels.
In Figure 2, the regions marked with dou-
ble-ended arrows are the critical section regions 
and excluding them are non-critical regions. 
Here, R is the transmission range of the net-
work, therefore the nodes in R range is one hop 
nodes which are connected directly without any 
intermediate nodes. The critical nodes are the 
nodes which lie in the critical section and the 
non-critical nodes lie in the non-critical region. 
The representation of critical and non-critical 
nodes is shown in Figure 2. In ELLDMR, only 
non-critical nodes are chosen as the forwarding 
nodes during the route discovery phase in order 
to prevent frequent link failures during packet 
transmission.
4.3. ELLDMR Route Discovery
The route discovery process is initiated by 
broadcasting the RREQ packet, mostly to the 
intermediate non-critical nodes in the direction 
of the destination. Figure 3 shows sample mul-
tiple paths discovered using non-critical nodes 
for the network given in Figure 2. This section 
discusses in detail the ELLDMR procedure 
to discover multiple paths using non-critical 
nodes. Like LLDMR, the intermediate nodes 
are grouped into different levels with respect 
to the distance from the destination. During 
RREQ broadcast, each intermediate node finds 
its next forwarding node and records it into the 
routing table. In ELLDMR, only the source 
node can send the RREQ packets to non-critical 
intra and inter-level nodes, all other intermedi-
ate nodes initially broadcast the RREQ only to 
their non-critical inter-level nodes in the direc-
tion of the destination. If the intermediate node 
does not find any non-critical inter-level nodes, 
it then broadcasts the RREQ packet to other 
inter-level and intra-level nodes. This can void 
the void [18] situation as in any other greedy 
routing protocol. The following are the ELLD-
MR route discovery steps for finding node dis-
joint multiple paths between any source and the 
destination node.
1. The source node floods the RREQ to the 
non-critical intra-level and non-critical in-
ter-level nodes in the request zone.
2. The nodes in the request zone discard the 
duplicate RREQ, otherwise it is accepted.
3. Upon accepting the RREQ packet, the in-
termediate node checks whether it is a des-
tination node.
4. If it is not a destination node,
(i) The intermediate node marks the sender 
node as its previous node in the routing 
table and sends the reverse route notifi-
cation to the sender node.
(ii) The sender node, upon receiving the 
notification from its neighbour node, 
marks the neighbour node as its next 
forwarding node in the routing table.
S
D 
Level-0 Level-1 Level-2 Level-3 
R (ms)
3R  (ms) 
2R (ms) 
Critical nodes Non critical nodes 
Figure 2. The network showing critical and non-critical nodes at each level.
Table 1.  Node Information Database.
Parameter Value
Node.Level Level of the node
Status (0/1) Visited / Unvisited node
Node (x, y) Node position
S.id Source id
S (x, y) Source position
D.id Destination id
D (x, y) Destination position
Inter-link nodes The link between adjacent level nodes.
Intra-link nodes The link between same level nodes.
TH (Nodemn) Node threshold value
TH-MIN (Leveln)
The minimum threshold value of the 
node's level.
TH-MAX (Leveln)
The maximum threshold value of 
the node's level.
Table 2.  Routing table information.
Prev → id Node.id Next → id
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source and destination and their different lev-
els, intra-level and inter-level nodes.
The neighbour list, information database, and 
routing table are the three data structures main-
tained by the forwarding nodes in ELLDMR. 
Their contents are:
 ● Neighbour List: In the neighbour list, each 
node maintains the neighbour (id, location, 
speed, direction) information.
 ● Node Information Database: Table 1 shows 
the record of data stored in each node. The 
node information database of ELLDMR 
includes the node's threshold value (TH 
(Nodemn)), level's minimum threshold val-
ue (TH-MIN (Leveln)), and level's maxi-
mum threshold value (TH-MAX (Leveln)) 
and other information of the node. These 
are calculated using equation (1, 2, 3) re-
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nodes which are connected directly without any 
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non-critical nodes are chosen as the forwarding 
nodes during the route discovery phase in order 
to prevent frequent link failures during packet 
transmission.
4.3. ELLDMR Route Discovery
The route discovery process is initiated by 
broadcasting the RREQ packet, mostly to the 
intermediate non-critical nodes in the direction 
of the destination. Figure 3 shows sample mul-
tiple paths discovered using non-critical nodes 
for the network given in Figure 2. This section 
discusses in detail the ELLDMR procedure 
to discover multiple paths using non-critical 
nodes. Like LLDMR, the intermediate nodes 
are grouped into different levels with respect 
to the distance from the destination. During 
RREQ broadcast, each intermediate node finds 
its next forwarding node and records it into the 
routing table. In ELLDMR, only the source 
node can send the RREQ packets to non-critical 
intra and inter-level nodes, all other intermedi-
ate nodes initially broadcast the RREQ only to 
their non-critical inter-level nodes in the direc-
tion of the destination. If the intermediate node 
does not find any non-critical inter-level nodes, 
it then broadcasts the RREQ packet to other 
inter-level and intra-level nodes. This can void 
the void [18] situation as in any other greedy 
routing protocol. The following are the ELLD-
MR route discovery steps for finding node dis-
joint multiple paths between any source and the 
destination node.
1. The source node floods the RREQ to the 
non-critical intra-level and non-critical in-
ter-level nodes in the request zone.
2. The nodes in the request zone discard the 
duplicate RREQ, otherwise it is accepted.
3. Upon accepting the RREQ packet, the in-
termediate node checks whether it is a des-
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Table 1.  Node Information Database.
Parameter Value
Node.Level Level of the node
Status (0/1) Visited / Unvisited node
Node (x, y) Node position
S.id Source id
S (x, y) Source position
D.id Destination id
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(iii) The intermediate node then forwards 
the RREQ to its non-critical inter-level 
nodes
(iv) If the intermediate nodes have more 
than one non-critical inter-level for-
warding node, they choose the one 
which has lesser mobility than others. 
This will ensure more lifetime for the 
routing link, so that the link failure will 
be infrequent.
(v) Then go to step 2 and repeat the process
5. If it is a destination node, it sends the re-
verse route to the sender node and stops 
the process of RREQ forwarding.
6. Then the destination node sends the route 
reply (RREP) packet to its previous node 
through the reverse route path formed us-
ing the previous node till it reaches the 
source node.
It finds node disjoint multipath by not accept-
ing the duplicate RREQ by the intermediate 
nodes similar to LLDMR. Though the ELLD-
MR does not find all the existing paths between 
the source and destination, the infrequent link 
failure compromises the life of the route during 
packet transmission.
The following are the differences between 
LLDMR and ELLDMR in the route-finding 
process.
1. In ELLDMR non-critical intermediate 
nodes are given more priority for RREQ 
broadcast.
2. The RREP from intermediate nodes is not 
accepted.
3. The intermediate nodes of ELLDMR 
maintain only the forwarding node infor-
mation in their routing table and so do not 
expose topology information.
4.4. Route Maintenance
The chance of a link failure is much smaller 
in SLLDMR than in LLDMR, because only 
non-critical nodes are used to find the path be-
tween the source and destination. In the rare 
case, when it is likely for link failure during 
packet transmission, like LLDMR, the pro-
posed algorithm SLLDMR also predicts the 
movement of non-critical nodes to the critical 
region. Thus, it switches to the alternate path 
even before the occurrence of link failure, by 
giving notice to the source node.
The ELLDMR is more concerned in finding 
stronger disjoint routing paths than the number 
of disjoint routing paths.  Though the ELLD-
MR does not discover all the available number 
of disjoint paths, it builds a stronger route be-
tween source and destination, thus eliminating 
frequent link failures and switching between 
the routes.
5. Secure Location-aided 
Level-based Disjoint Multipath 
Routing Protocol (SLLDMR)
5.1. Security Analysis
As said earlier, the routing in MANET is a crit-
ical issue, due to invasion of malicious nodes 
during the route discovery phase. Some of the 
routing attacks by which these malicious nodes 
get included in the routing path during the route 
discovery phase are as follows:
 ● Black-hole attack: The intermediate nodes 
communicate to the sender node that it has 
the shortest path to the destination.
 ● Rushing attack: The intermediate nodes, 
upon receiving the RREQ forward it im-
mediately (avoiding inter-frame delay) 
to their neighbour nodes. Thus, the path 
through the attacker node can reach the 
destination earlier.
 ● Worm-hole attack: It is formed by more 
than one attacker node, where these at-
tacker nodes build a tunnel between them 
and hide the presence of other intermediate 
nodes in between them. Thus, they adver-
tise false hop-count and get intrude in the 
routing path.
 ● Sybil attack: The attacker node imperson-
ates the identity of the legal nodes and gets 
included in the routing path.
5.2. Countermeasures Against Routing 
Attacks by TOHIP
The existing algorithm TOHIP has provided 
solution for the above-mentioned routing at-
tacks. Due to its topology hiding factor, the 
identity of the legal nodes is not exposed to the 
attacker nodes and thus they can avoid a Sybil 
attack. The intermediate nodes are not allowed 
to send RREP messages in TOHIP and so black-
hole attack is avoided. TOHIP uses hop count to 
resist rushing attack and so the path with small-
er number of hop counts is chosen as routing 
path. Similarly, to overcome the worm-hole at-
tack it uses round-trip time and fake hop-count 
is not taken into account during path discovery.
5.3. Issues in TOHIP
The rushing attack is one of the serious DoS 
attacks. According to TOHIP, the path is cho-
sen based on the hop-count and it does not de-
pend on the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between 
the source and destination. The rushing attack 
is likely to happen if the path chosen has an 
RTT between the source and destination much 
smaller than normal RTT. TOHIP cannot guar-
antee that the path formed with smaller hop-
count will definitely overcome rushing attack 
and so there is a possibility of the rushing attack 
to occur in the path with a shorter hop count. 
Also, obtaining public and private key from a 
centralized trusted server in MANET is not fea-
sible or reliable.
5.4. Counter Measures Against Routing 
Attacks by SLLDMR 
The SLLDMR is an extension of ELLDMR. 
The forwarding nodes of SLLDMR also main-
tain only next and previous hop information in 
the routing table and thus they hide topology 
information in the intermediate nodes. SLLD-
MR also does not allow intermediate nodes to 
send an RREP message and so the SLLDMR 
also prevents worm-hole attack, black-hole and 
Sybil attack similar to TOHIP. The proposed al-
gorithm, SLLDMR, provides a better solution 
to overcome the rushing attack.
5.5. Rushing Attack Prevention in 
SLLDMR
In SLLDMR the end to end delay of the RREQ 
packet from the sender node to the receiver 
node is the RREQ broadcast delay of the sender 
node. It is defined as the summation of all other 
delays the packet encounters from the time it is 
transmitted from the sender till it reaches the 
destination. The RREQ broadcast delay (TOT) 
is given as:
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nodes
(iv) If the intermediate nodes have more 
than one non-critical inter-level for-
warding node, they choose the one 
which has lesser mobility than others. 
This will ensure more lifetime for the 
routing link, so that the link failure will 
be infrequent.
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5. If it is a destination node, it sends the re-
verse route to the sender node and stops 
the process of RREQ forwarding.
6. Then the destination node sends the route 
reply (RREP) packet to its previous node 
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It finds node disjoint multipath by not accept-
ing the duplicate RREQ by the intermediate 
nodes similar to LLDMR. Though the ELLD-
MR does not find all the existing paths between 
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and hide the presence of other intermediate 
nodes in between them. Thus, they adver-
tise false hop-count and get intrude in the 
routing path.
 ● Sybil attack: The attacker node imperson-
ates the identity of the legal nodes and gets 
included in the routing path.
5.2. Countermeasures Against Routing 
Attacks by TOHIP
The existing algorithm TOHIP has provided 
solution for the above-mentioned routing at-
tacks. Due to its topology hiding factor, the 
identity of the legal nodes is not exposed to the 
attacker nodes and thus they can avoid a Sybil 
attack. The intermediate nodes are not allowed 
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is not taken into account during path discovery.
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The rushing attack is one of the serious DoS 
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sen based on the hop-count and it does not de-
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is likely to happen if the path chosen has an 
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smaller than normal RTT. TOHIP cannot guar-
antee that the path formed with smaller hop-
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to occur in the path with a shorter hop count. 
Also, obtaining public and private key from a 
centralized trusted server in MANET is not fea-
sible or reliable.
5.4. Counter Measures Against Routing 
Attacks by SLLDMR 
The SLLDMR is an extension of ELLDMR. 
The forwarding nodes of SLLDMR also main-
tain only next and previous hop information in 
the routing table and thus they hide topology 
information in the intermediate nodes. SLLD-
MR also does not allow intermediate nodes to 
send an RREP message and so the SLLDMR 
also prevents worm-hole attack, black-hole and 
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gorithm, SLLDMR, provides a better solution 
to overcome the rushing attack.
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In Figure 4, the TOTA and TOTB are the RREQ 
broadcast delay of the normal node (A) and 
rushing attacker node (M). It shows the RREQ 
broadcast delay of rushing attacker node (M) 
is less than a normal node (A). The attacker 
node (M) has a negligible processing delay and 
queuing delay compared to node (A). There-
fore, in order to overcome the rushing attack, 
the SLLDMR compares broadcast delay of the 
RREQ of each intermediate node with an Esti-
mated Broadcast Time (ERBT). If the RREQ 
broadcast delay of the intermediate node is less 
than ERBT, the RREQ is rejected, otherwise it 
is accepted. The ERBT is computed as given in 
equation 6.
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where Tt (RREQ), Tpp (RREQ), Tq (RREQ), Tp (RREQ) are 
the transmission, propagation, queuing and pro-
cessing time of RREQ packet which is deter-
mined as follows:
 ● Tt (RREQ) = N/R, where N is the number of 
bits, and R is the rate of transmission (bits/
second)
 ● Tpp (RREQ) = d/s, where d is the distance 
between sender and receiver and s is the 
speed of light for wireless transmission
 ● Tq (RREQ) = 1/(μ ‒ λ), where μ is the number 
of packets that can sustain per second and 
λ is the average rate at which packets are 
arriving to be serviced.
 ● Tp (RREQ) is the time it takes to process the 
packet header.
The ERBT value is calculated based on the past 
history value. The intermediate node records 
the RREQ receiving time on the packet before 
broadcasting it to the next intermediate node. 
The difference in receiving time of the interme-
diate nodes gives the RREQ broadcast delay. As 
the rushing attacker immediately forwards the 
RREQ packet to the intermediate node without 
any processing and queuing delay, it easily gets 
included in the routing path. So if the broadcast 
delay of the RREQ is less than ERBT (Equa-
tion 5), the RREQ packet is not accepted by the 
intermediate node, otherwise it is accepted. In 
this way, the RREQ packet from the rushing at-
tacker node is avoided and thus the occurrence 
of the rushing attack is prevented in SLLDMR.
5.6. Secured Packet Transmission in 
SLLDMR
In the enhanced TOHIP, the nodes are depen-
dent on the centralized trusted server for their 
public and private key certificates and so it is 
not highly reliable and secure. The SLLDMR 
is the extension of ELLDMR, where each node 
can generate its own public and private key 
certificate. Therefore, the nodes of SLLDMR 
employ the self-organized public key [19] tech-
nique to generate the private and public keys. 
In this algorithm, only the source and destina-
tion nodes are involved in the encryption and 
decryption process. Thus, the SLLDMR exhib-
its less routing packet overhead and end to end 
delay compared with enhanced TOHIP. When-
ever the source node wants to communicate 
with the destination node, both the source and 
destination nodes generate their own public key 
(PU) and private key (PR) pair before finding a 
path between them. The destination node trans-
mits its public key (PUD) along with LREP to 
the sender node during the location discovery 
phase. The source node, before transmitting 
its data packet (M) to the destination node, 
encrypts it with two level encryption process. 
This ensures reliable and secure delivery of the 
data packet (M).
5.6.1. Two Level Encryption and Decryption 
Process
Encryption process at the source node
The data packet (M) is encrypted twice at the 
source node before transmission. The proce-
dure and block diagram of two-level encryption 
processes at the source node are shown in Fig-
ure 5 and Figure 6.
During the first level of encryption, the data 
packet (M), source and destination identifier 
(S.id, D.id) are encrypted with the private key 
of the source node (PRs). During the second 
level of encryption, the encrypted data E1 (P1) 
and the source public key (PUS) are encrypt-
ed with the public key of the destination node 
(PUD). After the second encryption, the source 
node transmits the packet P which includes the 
encrypted data (E2 (P2)) and the original data 
packet (M) to its next forwarding node in the 
routing table.
Decryption process at the destination node
After receiving this data, the forwarding node 
upon receiving this packet (P) forwards it to its 
next forwarding node in its routing table until 
it reaches the destination node. The procedure 
and block diagram of two-level decryption pro-
cesses at the destination node are shown in Fig-
ure 7 and Figure 8.
The destination node, during its first level of de-
cryption, decrypts the encrypted data (E2(P2)) 
with its private key and obtains the encrypted 
data (E1(P1)) and source public key (PUS). 
During the second level of decryption, destina-
tion node decrypts the encrypted data (E1(P1)) 
with the public key of the source node (PUS) 
and obtains the decrypted original data (M). 
Before accepting this data, it is checked with 
the original data (M). If both the data are same, 
the data is accepted, otherwise the destination 
node sends the notification to the source node 













Figure 4. Comparison of RREQ end-to-end delay 
between a normal node (A) and 




Step 1: Encrypt (PRS (M,S.id, D.id) = E1(P1) 
Step 2: Encrypt (PUD (E1 (P1), PUS) = E2(P2) 
Step 3: Source node sends the packet P = (E2 (P2).M) 
            to the next forwarding node 
Figure 5. Procedure for two-level encryption processes 
at the source node.
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Figure 6. Block diagram showing two-level 
encryption processes at the source node.
         
Step 1: Decrypt PRD(E2(P2)) = ((E1(P1), PUS)) 
Step 2: Decrypt PUS ((E1(P1))=(M, S.id, D.id) 
Step 3: Destination checks for source and   
              destination identity. 
Step 4: The resultant data (M) are compared    
              with the original data (M) 
Figure 7. The procedure shows two-level decryption 















Figure 8. Block diagram showing two-level decryption 
process at the destination node.
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In Figure 4, the TOTA and TOTB are the RREQ 
broadcast delay of the normal node (A) and 
rushing attacker node (M). It shows the RREQ 
broadcast delay of rushing attacker node (M) 
is less than a normal node (A). The attacker 
node (M) has a negligible processing delay and 
queuing delay compared to node (A). There-
fore, in order to overcome the rushing attack, 
the SLLDMR compares broadcast delay of the 
RREQ of each intermediate node with an Esti-
mated Broadcast Time (ERBT). If the RREQ 
broadcast delay of the intermediate node is less 
than ERBT, the RREQ is rejected, otherwise it 
is accepted. The ERBT is computed as given in 
equation 6.
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dent on the centralized trusted server for their 
public and private key certificates and so it is 
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6. Performance Evaluation of 
ELLDMR and SLLDMR
6.1. Network Simulator NS2
NS2 network simulator is one of the best ex-
isting network simulators for evaluating the 
network performance of wired and wireless 
networks. It is a free open source discrete event 
simulator and can be installed easily regardless 
of any operating system. Nowadays, it is widely 
accepted in the industry and supports the simu-
lation of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET). 
In the literature, most of the research work on 
MANET routing protocols and network func-
tions and protocols are simulated and evaluated 
using NS2. Due to its flexibility and modular 
nature, NS2 has gained popularity in the net-
working research community.
6.2. Network Topology
The following network topology assumptions 
are used in the simulation setup of the proposed 
algorithms.
 ● Since the proposed algorithms are loca-
tion-based, the GPS receiver is enabled in 
all the nodes. The current (x, y) position of 
the nodes and their node velocity are pro-
vided by these GPS receivers.
 ● In the simulation environment, the nodes 
are homogeneous where they are equipped 
with IEEE 802.11 transceivers with a max-
imum of 250 m transmission range.
 ● The proposed algorithm ELLDMR and 
SLLDMR are implemented using the NS2 
simulator and topology parameters are 
specified in Table 3.
6.3. Result and Analysis
6.3.1. Performance Analysis of ELLDMR in 
the Non-adversarial Scenario
Routing Packet Overhead (RPO). In Figure 
9, the average RPO of ELLDMR is compared 
with TOHIP and LLDMR for the different num-
ber of nodes at node velocity of 25 m/s.
Figure 9 shows that in ELLDMR, there is a 9% 
increase in RPO compared to LLDMR for 50 
nodes. It is because, unlike LLDMR, the RREP 
packet from the intermediate nodes is not ac-
cepted in ELLDMR. This reduces the usage of 
the available path from the intermediate nodes 
and so increases the RREQ broadcast till the 
destination. But the analysis shows that for an 
increase of 300 nodes, the RPO of ELLDMR 
decreases by 5% and 1.7% than TOHIP and 
LLDMR. It is because, in LLDMR and TO-
HIP, the RREQ packet is broadcasted to all the 
neighbour nodes and so it increases the RPO in 
these protocols with an increase in the number 
of dynamic nodes. But in ELLDMR, the RREQ 
is broadcasted only to the non-critical neigh-
bour nodes. Therefore, even though the overall 
RPO grows with an increase in the number of 
nodes in ELLDMR, it is comparatively lesser 
than LLDMR and TOHIP.
End to End delay (E2E). The comparison 
analysis of the average end to end delay of 
ELLDMR with TOHIP and LLDMR for differ-
ent node velocities is shown in Figure 10. In 
this analysis, the MANET with 200 nodes is 
considered. The analysis interprets that at zero 
node velocity the end to end delay in ELLDMR 
is 3% longer than LLDMR and 3% shorter than 
TOHIP. But as the node velocity increases to 40 
m/s, the end to end delay of ELLDMR is 9% 
and 13% shorter than LLDMR and ELLDMR 
respectively.
This is because, as said already, the ELLDMR 
does not accept the routing path from interme-
diate nodes, it takes longer E2E delay in find-
ing the path than LLDMR during static net-
work. But, as the node velocity increases, the 
link failure also increases in the MANET. As 
the ELLDMR uses only the non-critical nodes 
for building the routing path, the link lifetime 
of its routing link is considerably increased. So, 
the link breakage is less frequent in ELLDMR 
than in LLDMR and TOHIP. In multipath rout-
ing protocols, the frequent link failure causes 
switching of packet transmission between the 
available paths and may also sometime lead to 
the rediscovery of routing path which finally 
results in longer end to end delay during packet 
transmission. Therefore, at higher node veloci-
ty, the ELLDMR shows lesser end to end delay 
than LLDMR and TOHIP.
Figure 11 shows the comparison of an end to 
end delay between LLDMR and ELLDMR for 
sparse network and dense network. The ELLD-
MR performs better in the dense network than 
in the sparse network. The ELLDMR takes 
more time for route discovery phase at the 
sparse network because, due to the lesser num-
ber of nodes in the network, the availability of 
non-critical nodes is less and so it has to include 
critical nodes in the routing path to avoid void 
[18] situation. But in the dense network, the 
availability of non-critical nodes is greater and 
so it takes less time to build the routing path in 
ELLDMR than LLDMR.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). In Figure 12, 
the PDR of ELLDMR is compared with TOHIP 
and LLDMR for different node velocities for a 
total of 200 nodes in the network.
Figure 9. Number of nodes vs. average RPO at 25 m/s.
Table 3.  Simulation parameter.
Parameter Values
Simulation area 1000 m × 1000 m
Number of mobile nodes 300
Simulation time 800 s
Pause time 30 s
Number of 
source-destination pairs 10
Packet generation rate 1 packet/s
Packet size 512 bytes
Node velocity 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 m/s
Number of attacker nodes 0 ,5,10,15,25
Figure 10. Node velocity vs. average end to end delay 
for 200 nodes.
Figure 11. The number of nodes vs. end to end delay at 
25 m/s.
Figure 12. Node velocity vs. PDR for 200 nodes.
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6. Performance Evaluation of 
ELLDMR and SLLDMR
6.1. Network Simulator NS2
NS2 network simulator is one of the best ex-
isting network simulators for evaluating the 
network performance of wired and wireless 
networks. It is a free open source discrete event 
simulator and can be installed easily regardless 
of any operating system. Nowadays, it is widely 
accepted in the industry and supports the simu-
lation of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET). 
In the literature, most of the research work on 
MANET routing protocols and network func-
tions and protocols are simulated and evaluated 
using NS2. Due to its flexibility and modular 
nature, NS2 has gained popularity in the net-
working research community.
6.2. Network Topology
The following network topology assumptions 
are used in the simulation setup of the proposed 
algorithms.
 ● Since the proposed algorithms are loca-
tion-based, the GPS receiver is enabled in 
all the nodes. The current (x, y) position of 
the nodes and their node velocity are pro-
vided by these GPS receivers.
 ● In the simulation environment, the nodes 
are homogeneous where they are equipped 
with IEEE 802.11 transceivers with a max-
imum of 250 m transmission range.
 ● The proposed algorithm ELLDMR and 
SLLDMR are implemented using the NS2 
simulator and topology parameters are 
specified in Table 3.
6.3. Result and Analysis
6.3.1. Performance Analysis of ELLDMR in 
the Non-adversarial Scenario
Routing Packet Overhead (RPO). In Figure 
9, the average RPO of ELLDMR is compared 
with TOHIP and LLDMR for the different num-
ber of nodes at node velocity of 25 m/s.
Figure 9 shows that in ELLDMR, there is a 9% 
increase in RPO compared to LLDMR for 50 
nodes. It is because, unlike LLDMR, the RREP 
packet from the intermediate nodes is not ac-
cepted in ELLDMR. This reduces the usage of 
the available path from the intermediate nodes 
and so increases the RREQ broadcast till the 
destination. But the analysis shows that for an 
increase of 300 nodes, the RPO of ELLDMR 
decreases by 5% and 1.7% than TOHIP and 
LLDMR. It is because, in LLDMR and TO-
HIP, the RREQ packet is broadcasted to all the 
neighbour nodes and so it increases the RPO in 
these protocols with an increase in the number 
of dynamic nodes. But in ELLDMR, the RREQ 
is broadcasted only to the non-critical neigh-
bour nodes. Therefore, even though the overall 
RPO grows with an increase in the number of 
nodes in ELLDMR, it is comparatively lesser 
than LLDMR and TOHIP.
End to End delay (E2E). The comparison 
analysis of the average end to end delay of 
ELLDMR with TOHIP and LLDMR for differ-
ent node velocities is shown in Figure 10. In 
this analysis, the MANET with 200 nodes is 
considered. The analysis interprets that at zero 
node velocity the end to end delay in ELLDMR 
is 3% longer than LLDMR and 3% shorter than 
TOHIP. But as the node velocity increases to 40 
m/s, the end to end delay of ELLDMR is 9% 
and 13% shorter than LLDMR and ELLDMR 
respectively.
This is because, as said already, the ELLDMR 
does not accept the routing path from interme-
diate nodes, it takes longer E2E delay in find-
ing the path than LLDMR during static net-
work. But, as the node velocity increases, the 
link failure also increases in the MANET. As 
the ELLDMR uses only the non-critical nodes 
for building the routing path, the link lifetime 
of its routing link is considerably increased. So, 
the link breakage is less frequent in ELLDMR 
than in LLDMR and TOHIP. In multipath rout-
ing protocols, the frequent link failure causes 
switching of packet transmission between the 
available paths and may also sometime lead to 
the rediscovery of routing path which finally 
results in longer end to end delay during packet 
transmission. Therefore, at higher node veloci-
ty, the ELLDMR shows lesser end to end delay 
than LLDMR and TOHIP.
Figure 11 shows the comparison of an end to 
end delay between LLDMR and ELLDMR for 
sparse network and dense network. The ELLD-
MR performs better in the dense network than 
in the sparse network. The ELLDMR takes 
more time for route discovery phase at the 
sparse network because, due to the lesser num-
ber of nodes in the network, the availability of 
non-critical nodes is less and so it has to include 
critical nodes in the routing path to avoid void 
[18] situation. But in the dense network, the 
availability of non-critical nodes is greater and 
so it takes less time to build the routing path in 
ELLDMR than LLDMR.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). In Figure 12, 
the PDR of ELLDMR is compared with TOHIP 
and LLDMR for different node velocities for a 
total of 200 nodes in the network.
Figure 9. Number of nodes vs. average RPO at 25 m/s.
Table 3.  Simulation parameter.
Parameter Values
Simulation area 1000 m × 1000 m
Number of mobile nodes 300
Simulation time 800 s
Pause time 30 s
Number of 
source-destination pairs 10
Packet generation rate 1 packet/s
Packet size 512 bytes
Node velocity 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 m/s
Number of attacker nodes 0 ,5,10,15,25
Figure 10. Node velocity vs. average end to end delay 
for 200 nodes.
Figure 11. The number of nodes vs. end to end delay at 
25 m/s.
Figure 12. Node velocity vs. PDR for 200 nodes.
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At zero node velocity, the ELLDMR, LLD-
MR, and TOHIP do not show much variation 
in PDR. But for 20 m/s node velocity, the PDR 
of ELLDMR increases by 2.6% and 3.8% 
compared to TOHIP and LLDMR and for 40 
m/s, there is 4.5% and 17.7% increase in PDR 
respectively. This is because, as the node ve-
locity increases, there is more link failures in 
MANET. The main objective of ELLDMR is to 
increase the link lifetime of the routing path by 
building the route with non-critical nodes. This 
reduces the frequent link failure in ELLDMR 
and therefore, the packet loss due to frequent 
link failures is reduced considerably in ELLD-
MR. This improves the PDR of ELLDMR when 
compared with the existing protocols LLDMR 
and TOHIP.
6.3.2. Performance Analysis of ELLDMR and 
SLLDMR Under Non-adversarial and 
Adversarial Scenario
The SLLDMR is the security protocol and is 
an extension of ELLDMR. Its performance 
is compared with unsecured protocols LLD-
MR and ELLDMR and with secured protocol 
TOHIP. In this simulation, the network of 200 
nodes and 25 m/s node velocity is considered.
Routing overhead. The comparison of aver-
age RPO between SLLDMR, ELLDMR, LLD-
MR, and TOHIP is shown in Figure 13. In the 
analysis between SLLDMR, ELLDMR, and 
LLDMR, for zero attacker nodes, SLLDMR 
gives more RPO because it incorporates two 
level cryptographic techniques during RREQ 
broadcast. But as the number of attacker nodes 
increases during packet transmission, due to 
its enhanced security features, the effect of 
the attacker node is less in SLLDMR than in 
ELLDMR and LLDMR. Also, the chance of re-
discovery of the route is less in SLLDMR and 
so, for 25 attacker nodes, the RPO of SLLDMR 
decreases by 5% and 13% compared to ELLD-
MR and LLMDR respectively.
In the comparison of RPO between the SLLD-
MR and TOHIP, the RPO of SLLDMR is 2% 
and 8% lesser than that of TOHIP for 5 and 25 
attacker nodes respectively. It is because TO-
HIP generates public and private keys through 
the centralized trusted server where it involves 
more routing overhead for transferring the 
keys, but the SLLDMR incorporates self-or-
ganized public key management where nodes 
manage their own public key and private key. 
Therefore, the RPO of SLLDMR is compara-
tively less than that of TOHIP.
End to End delay. Figure 14 shows the com-
parison of Average E2E delay between SLLD-
MR, ELLDMR, LLDMR, and TOHIP. The 
SLLDMR and TOHIP depict similar perfor-
mance for lesser attacker nodes but as the num-
ber of attacker nodes increases, the E2E of the 
SLLDMR decreases by 7%. It is because, as 
said earlier, the SLLDMR incorporates self-or-
ganized public key management technique and 
also encryption and decryption are done only at 
the source and destination nodes. This reduces 
some considerable amount of time during route 
discovery in SLLDMR vs. TOHIP.  Similarly, 
when SLLDMR is compared with LLDMR and 
ELLDMR, the analysis shows that the E2E of 
SLLDMR is overall better than the other two 
for the increase in the number of attacker nodes. 
Normally the SLLDMR takes some period of 
time for processing the two-level cryptographic 
technique. Therefore, for zero attacker nodes, it 
shows more E2E delay than LLDMR and ELLD-
MR do, but as the number of attacker nodes in-
creases, the security in SLLDMR during packet 
transmission compromises the performance of 
LLDMR and ELLDMR. Moreover, the SLLD-
MR protects the forwarding nodes from rushing 
attack during route discovery. Therefore, the re-
transmission of packets due to link failure and 
packet loss is comparatively less in SLLDMR 
and so for higher attacker nodes, it shows better 
performance than LLDMR and ELLDMR do.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). Figure 15 
shows the comparison of PDR between SLLD-
MR, ELLDMR, LLDMR, and TOHIP.  Since 
all these protocols are multipath routing proto-
cols, for non-adversarial scenario i.e. for zero 
attacker nodes all of them give nearly 95% 
packet delivery. But as the number of attack-
er nodes increases, the ELLDMR and TOHIP 
perform better than LLDMR and TOHIP. It is 
because in these protocols, the intermediate 
nodes are not aware of the routing path and so 
they avoid network attacks like black-hole and 
worm-hole attacks. Also, both of them exhibit 
encryption technique for packet transmission 
and so the PDR of SLLDMR increases by 3% 
and 8% compared with ELLDMR and LLDMR 
for 25 attacker nodes. In comparison between 
the SLLDMR and TOHIP, frequent link failures 
are less in SLLDMR and so the packet loss due 
to link failure is less in ELLDMR than SLLD-
MR. Therefore, the overall analysis depicts that 
the SLLDMR gives better PDR than LLDMR, 
ELLDMR, and TOHIP.
7. Conclusion
The major contribution of this work is to re-
duce the routing overhead and provide security 
against several routing attacks in MANET. The 
ELLDMR and SLLDMR hide routing infor-
mation in the intermediate nodes and so they 
are secure against the black hole, worm hole, 
and Sybil attacks. Since ELLDMR uses only 
non-critical nodes for finding the routing path, 
it minimizes frequent link failure during pack-
et transmission. The data security is very much 
essential in MANET as its major applications 
are in wireless sensor networks, data networks, 
tactical networks, etc. The SLLDMR uses 
two-level encryption and decryption processes 
for secure packet transmission. As it does not 
involve any centralized trusted server for public 
or private key generation, it is cost effective and 
reliable. The extensive simulation results show 
that the ELLDMR and SLLDMR have better 
network performance than other existing mul-
tipath routing protocols.
The limitation of the proposed algorithm is that 
it considers only node movement as the major 
cause for link failure during transmission of the 
packet. Since the MANETs are a network of 
mobile nodes, another important reason for the 
link failure in such a network is the node's en-
ergy dissipation. Due to limited energy and re-
source constraint in these nodes, its energy gets 
easily drained and makes the node dead. In the 
proposed algorithms, ELLDMR and SLLDMR 
have not addressed the link failure problem due 
to energy loss in the nodes. The future work is 
to select the non-critical nodes with more en-
ergy as the forwarding node while finding the 
node-disjoint multipath in MANET.
Figure 13. Number of attacker nodes vs. average RPO.
Figure 14. No. of attacker nodes vs. end to end delay. Figure 15. No. of attacker nodes vs. PDR.
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At zero node velocity, the ELLDMR, LLD-
MR, and TOHIP do not show much variation 
in PDR. But for 20 m/s node velocity, the PDR 
of ELLDMR increases by 2.6% and 3.8% 
compared to TOHIP and LLDMR and for 40 
m/s, there is 4.5% and 17.7% increase in PDR 
respectively. This is because, as the node ve-
locity increases, there is more link failures in 
MANET. The main objective of ELLDMR is to 
increase the link lifetime of the routing path by 
building the route with non-critical nodes. This 
reduces the frequent link failure in ELLDMR 
and therefore, the packet loss due to frequent 
link failures is reduced considerably in ELLD-
MR. This improves the PDR of ELLDMR when 
compared with the existing protocols LLDMR 
and TOHIP.
6.3.2. Performance Analysis of ELLDMR and 
SLLDMR Under Non-adversarial and 
Adversarial Scenario
The SLLDMR is the security protocol and is 
an extension of ELLDMR. Its performance 
is compared with unsecured protocols LLD-
MR and ELLDMR and with secured protocol 
TOHIP. In this simulation, the network of 200 
nodes and 25 m/s node velocity is considered.
Routing overhead. The comparison of aver-
age RPO between SLLDMR, ELLDMR, LLD-
MR, and TOHIP is shown in Figure 13. In the 
analysis between SLLDMR, ELLDMR, and 
LLDMR, for zero attacker nodes, SLLDMR 
gives more RPO because it incorporates two 
level cryptographic techniques during RREQ 
broadcast. But as the number of attacker nodes 
increases during packet transmission, due to 
its enhanced security features, the effect of 
the attacker node is less in SLLDMR than in 
ELLDMR and LLDMR. Also, the chance of re-
discovery of the route is less in SLLDMR and 
so, for 25 attacker nodes, the RPO of SLLDMR 
decreases by 5% and 13% compared to ELLD-
MR and LLMDR respectively.
In the comparison of RPO between the SLLD-
MR and TOHIP, the RPO of SLLDMR is 2% 
and 8% lesser than that of TOHIP for 5 and 25 
attacker nodes respectively. It is because TO-
HIP generates public and private keys through 
the centralized trusted server where it involves 
more routing overhead for transferring the 
keys, but the SLLDMR incorporates self-or-
ganized public key management where nodes 
manage their own public key and private key. 
Therefore, the RPO of SLLDMR is compara-
tively less than that of TOHIP.
End to End delay. Figure 14 shows the com-
parison of Average E2E delay between SLLD-
MR, ELLDMR, LLDMR, and TOHIP. The 
SLLDMR and TOHIP depict similar perfor-
mance for lesser attacker nodes but as the num-
ber of attacker nodes increases, the E2E of the 
SLLDMR decreases by 7%. It is because, as 
said earlier, the SLLDMR incorporates self-or-
ganized public key management technique and 
also encryption and decryption are done only at 
the source and destination nodes. This reduces 
some considerable amount of time during route 
discovery in SLLDMR vs. TOHIP.  Similarly, 
when SLLDMR is compared with LLDMR and 
ELLDMR, the analysis shows that the E2E of 
SLLDMR is overall better than the other two 
for the increase in the number of attacker nodes. 
Normally the SLLDMR takes some period of 
time for processing the two-level cryptographic 
technique. Therefore, for zero attacker nodes, it 
shows more E2E delay than LLDMR and ELLD-
MR do, but as the number of attacker nodes in-
creases, the security in SLLDMR during packet 
transmission compromises the performance of 
LLDMR and ELLDMR. Moreover, the SLLD-
MR protects the forwarding nodes from rushing 
attack during route discovery. Therefore, the re-
transmission of packets due to link failure and 
packet loss is comparatively less in SLLDMR 
and so for higher attacker nodes, it shows better 
performance than LLDMR and ELLDMR do.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). Figure 15 
shows the comparison of PDR between SLLD-
MR, ELLDMR, LLDMR, and TOHIP.  Since 
all these protocols are multipath routing proto-
cols, for non-adversarial scenario i.e. for zero 
attacker nodes all of them give nearly 95% 
packet delivery. But as the number of attack-
er nodes increases, the ELLDMR and TOHIP 
perform better than LLDMR and TOHIP. It is 
because in these protocols, the intermediate 
nodes are not aware of the routing path and so 
they avoid network attacks like black-hole and 
worm-hole attacks. Also, both of them exhibit 
encryption technique for packet transmission 
and so the PDR of SLLDMR increases by 3% 
and 8% compared with ELLDMR and LLDMR 
for 25 attacker nodes. In comparison between 
the SLLDMR and TOHIP, frequent link failures 
are less in SLLDMR and so the packet loss due 
to link failure is less in ELLDMR than SLLD-
MR. Therefore, the overall analysis depicts that 
the SLLDMR gives better PDR than LLDMR, 
ELLDMR, and TOHIP.
7. Conclusion
The major contribution of this work is to re-
duce the routing overhead and provide security 
against several routing attacks in MANET. The 
ELLDMR and SLLDMR hide routing infor-
mation in the intermediate nodes and so they 
are secure against the black hole, worm hole, 
and Sybil attacks. Since ELLDMR uses only 
non-critical nodes for finding the routing path, 
it minimizes frequent link failure during pack-
et transmission. The data security is very much 
essential in MANET as its major applications 
are in wireless sensor networks, data networks, 
tactical networks, etc. The SLLDMR uses 
two-level encryption and decryption processes 
for secure packet transmission. As it does not 
involve any centralized trusted server for public 
or private key generation, it is cost effective and 
reliable. The extensive simulation results show 
that the ELLDMR and SLLDMR have better 
network performance than other existing mul-
tipath routing protocols.
The limitation of the proposed algorithm is that 
it considers only node movement as the major 
cause for link failure during transmission of the 
packet. Since the MANETs are a network of 
mobile nodes, another important reason for the 
link failure in such a network is the node's en-
ergy dissipation. Due to limited energy and re-
source constraint in these nodes, its energy gets 
easily drained and makes the node dead. In the 
proposed algorithms, ELLDMR and SLLDMR 
have not addressed the link failure problem due 
to energy loss in the nodes. The future work is 
to select the non-critical nodes with more en-
ergy as the forwarding node while finding the 
node-disjoint multipath in MANET.
Figure 13. Number of attacker nodes vs. average RPO.
Figure 14. No. of attacker nodes vs. end to end delay. Figure 15. No. of attacker nodes vs. PDR.
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